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Abstract in English 
This paper discusses the assessment of subsidiarity in the European Union from a broad fiscal 
federalism perspective. It incorporates recent insights from political economy analyses of fiscal 
federalism to arrive at a list of issues that need to be taken into account when considering 
whether concrete policies should be centralised in the European Union or not.  
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Abstract in Dutch 
Dit paper analyseert subsidiariteit in de Europese Unie vanuit het perspectief van de 
economische theorie over federaties. Het incorporeert recente inzichten over de politieke 
economie van federaties en presenteert een aantal factoren die van belang zijn om af te wegen 
of beleid gecentraliseerd moet worden in de Europese Unie of niet.  
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Preface 
Several developments underscore the need for a systematic assessment of the delineation of 
policies between the European Union and the member states: broadening of the scope of 
European policy over recent decades, enlargement of the Union and changing attitudes of 
citizens towards Europe. Therefore, the European Commission, CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs have organised a two-
day conference on Subsidiarity and Economic Reform in Europe (November 8-9, 2006 in 
Brussels). The main topic of the conference is to discuss whether improvements in the division 
of competences between the Union and the member states exist that enhance the effectiveness 
of economic policy, in particular concerning the implementation of the Lisbon goals. 
  
Serving as a background for the conference, this paper provides an overview of the economic 
arguments for decentralisation and centralisation of government policy. The paper is a co-
production of Sjef Ederveen, who currently works at the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and started this work while affiliated with CPB, George Gelauff, deputy director at CPB, and 
Jacques Pelkmans, Jan Tinbergen Chair and director of the Department of European Economic 
Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges and member of the Scientific Council for 
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Summary 
Assessing subsidiarity means reviewing the trade-off between decentralisation and 
centralisation for specific policy fields. In the context of the Europe, the principle of 
subsidiarity states that powers should only be shifted to the level of the European Union, when 
the member states themselves can not achieve the same results. To assess that principle, it is 
necessary to examine which arguments underscore decentralisation and which centralisation. 
This paper presents these arguments, based on a survey of the literature on fiscal federalism, 
including recent papers that take a political economy perspective.  
The basic economic theory of fiscal federalism explores the trade-off between preference 
matching and internalisation of cross-border external effects or economies of scale. The 
principal motive for decentralisation is to match the variety of preferences that exist in different 
jurisdictions or member states in case of the EU. In contrast, centralisation may be warranted 
when a national policy of a member state has consequences for another member state that are 
not taken into account in its decision making process (cross-border externalities). In addition, 
the presence of fixed costs may make decentralised policies suboptimal. In that case 
centralisation benefits from economies of scale. This trade-off leads to a functional subsidiarity 
test that emphasises the justification of centralisation by cross-border externalities or economies 
of scale.   
The functional subsidiarity test is based on three main assumptions about government 
behaviour: benevolent governments that face no costs of policy design, provision of uniform 
policies at the central level, and a mode of decision making in which each level of government 
act as a central planner. Relaxing these assumptions adds political economy arguments to the 
analysis. When national governments pursue their own interests instead of the public interest, 
decentralisation may enhance accountability. It provides citizens with stronger opportunities to 
monitor and control governments.  In addition, policy competition between decentralised 
governments may create incentives for governments to seek the public interest and to provide 
services efficiently. At the level of the EU government failure may arise, if Europe pursues 
overly centralistic policies and is able to implement these. Effective monitoring and control by 
the member states may act as a counterbalance.  
Imperfect governments may fall victim to lobby groups. The impact of lobbying on the 
trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation is indeterminate. It depends on the specific 
conditions in a given policy area whether a central or a local government faces a higher risk of 
being captured. In particular, if the objectives of domestic and foreign lobby groups are aligned, 
centralisation means that the foreign lobby obtains an additional channel to influence the 
domestic government. 
At times governments face considerable challenges to devise adequate measures in complex 
policy fields. Even a government that honestly pursues the common good may not be 
knowledgeable or creative enough to devise the most suitable policies. Decentralisation   10 
facilitates experimentation and creates possibilities for mutual learning. On a centralised level 
policy learning can be strengthened by information exchange and building commitment to 
engage in economic reform. In this respect a trade-off does not exist: decentralisation and 
centralisation are complementary. 
Abandoning the assumption of a central planner makes the analysis of decision making at 
the centralised level more realistic. European governance can be considered as a type of 
federalism in which regional delegates form a legislature that makes decisions. This type of 
federalism brings about several inefficiencies associated with centralisation. An attitude of 
deference among the representatives in the legislature may result in approval of inefficient 
policies and projects, such as transfers that benefit specific regions. Common pool problems, in 
which member states have an incentive to draw as much as possible on the common budget for 
projects that locally provide benefits, may also lead to over-supply of public goods at the central 
level. These inefficiencies may raise the weight of decentralisation in the trade-off between 
decentralisation and centralisation.  
The division of competences between Europe and the member states is not fixed. In the 
course of time trends, such as globalisation, may affect the trade-off between decentralisation 
and centralisation. For instance, larger foreign direct investment flows may increase cross-
border externalities when countries try to attract subsidiaries of multinational companies. 
Trends may imply that the subsidiarity assessment of tomorrow differs from that of today. 
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1  Introduction 
Many people claim that Europe is in a political crisis. With the enlargement of the European 
Union with ten new member states in May 2004, there is a strong need for reconsidering the 
political decision making processes in the European Union. The political leaders tried to cope 
with this need by designing a Constitution for the European Union. However, the voters in 
France and the Netherlands opposed ratification of this Constitution in mid-2005. The reasons 
behind this rejection were diverse. Some people voted against the Constitution because they felt 
that is was going too far, others voted against it because they felt it was not going far enough 
(see Dekker and Ederveen, 2005, for further analysis of this issue). This heterogeneity of 
attitudes towards further Europeanisation has been well recognized by the European 
Commission. It was therefore decided to postpone referendums in a number of other countries 
and opt for a period of reflection, in which the need and ambition of a new treaty for the 
European Union could be reconsidered.  
There is indeed a search for the optimal design of the European Union. After the successful 
conclusion of the Internal Market program in 1992, the scope of the European Union has 
gradually been widened to include areas of public policy that previously remained within the 
more or less exclusive powers of the member states. Such areas include monetary and 
budgetary policy (through the Stability and Growth Pact), energy and telecom, environmental 
policy, social policy, innovation policy and immigration policy. Although the extent of 
European involvement widely differs in each domain, it seems nevertheless clear that, 
nowadays, Europe matters far beyond the common market for goods, and also includes 
increasingly wider elements of the public domain. 
The causes for this widening of scope are various. The introduction of EMU was meant to 
strengthen the European economy per se by handing over sovereignty in monetary policy to 
Frankfurt. Cross-border environmental problems in Europe legitimised a common European 
approach. The liberalisation trend in member states implied that (semi) public services (energy, 
health care) had to fit within existing European schemes of the internal market, competition 
policy and state aid. The Lisbon process brought economic reforms in the member states within 
the realm of European coordination. For instance, with innovation being a target in the Lisbon 
agenda, European cooperation in innovation policy was strengthened. Some other areas 
apparently were included in the European agenda to show European citizens that European 
integration was not simply an ‘economic’ affair, but also related to social concerns. 
Whatever the causes of a more prominent role for Europe, it is not at all clear beforehand 
whether the current level of centralised decision making is necessary and desirable in the 
European Union and whether further centralisation will be justified. To quote Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir (2006): ‘Also the EU rationale of any item on the Lisbon 2 agenda
1 should be spelled out 
explicitly.’ To make such a claim, requires explicitly weighing the pros and cons of 
 
1 Lisbon 2 is the revitalised Lisbon strategy after the midterm review in 2005-2006.   12 
centralisation. This is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, which states that powers 
should only be shifted to the level of the European Community, when the member states 
themselves can not achieve the same results.  
To provide inputs for an assessment of subsidiarity in specific policy fields, this paper 
reviews the main motives for decentralisation and centralisation. Several motives underscore 
decentralisation, such as the ability to align policy closer to the preferences of regional 
constituents. In contrast, centralisation may be warranted in a policy field characterised by 
increasing returns to scale or it may be useful if thereby it could create commitment for 
economic reform. However centralisation may also fail to be useful, for example when local 
jurisdictions attempt to extract funds from the budget of a higher level of government.  
Subsidiarity in the European Union 
In the European context the principle of subsidiarity was only introduced quite recently. Although it is now generally 
acknowledged as the guiding principle for dividing powers in the European Union, it was hardly ever mentioned in the 
official European texts until the late 1980s. Fears of centralised power then led to the idea to place the burden of 
argument  with  the  advocates  for  further  European  integration.  This  idea  was  especially  supported  by  Britain  and 
Germany.  Britain  feared  European  federalism,  and  the  German  Länder  sought  to  maintain  their  exclusive  powers 
enjoyed in the German Federal Republic. (Føllesdal, 1998) The first time that the principle of subsidiarity is explicitly 
mentioned is in the European Single Act of 1986 (article 130r, ad 4), dealing with environmental policy.  
Finally, in 1992, the principle of subsidiarity was officially introduced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (article 3b), and 
moved to article 5 in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The formulation in article 5 holds that: 
1.  “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives 
assigned to it therein.” 
2.  “In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community.”  
3.  “Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”  
 
This formulation first identifies the applicability of the principle. It is limited to those areas where the Community and the 
member  states  have  shared  powers.  Then  it  goes  on  to  identify  reasons  (scale  or  effects)  that  may  call  for 
centralisation. It concludes with the proportionality claim that any action should be as simple as possible. Note that this 
paper takes a general view on subsidiarity, which in principle can be applied to any policy domain, and thus abstracts 
from the first condition in article 5. 
 
The motives for centralisation and decentralisation follow from the literature on fiscal 
federalism, including recent analyses that take a political economy perspective. Section 2 
reviews the basic arguments starting from the premise of a benevolent government. Section 3 
adds motives related to government failure and policy learning. Section 4 focuses on the 
political process between a number of countries that delegate representatives to a central 
legislature, which makes decisions at the centralised level. It identifies several failures of 
centralisation that originate from negotiations and conflicts of interests in the legislature.   13 
Section 5 touches upon dynamic aspects of subsidiarity. Centralisation that was optimal two 
decades ago might not be optimal anymore. Section 6 concludes with an overview of the major 
motives relevant to an assessment of subsidiarity.  
Subsidiarity and centralisation 
In the debate about subsidiarity, people often confuse the concept of subsidiarity with delegating power to the lowest 
possible level. With respect to accession to EMU, Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004) for instance claim that “the principle 
of subsidiarity should apply to Euro membership, placing decisions over entry in the hands of individual member states.” 
And also in their otherwise excellent paper on subsidiarity, CESifo (2003) states: “With heterogeneity in preferences, the 
principle of subsidiarity should be applied, that is each country should be allowed to choose its preferred combination of 
wages and social standards.” However, it would be a mistake to think of subsidiarity and lower level decision making as 
synonyms. The subsidiarity principle in itself is neutral about the optimal degree of centralisation. Rather, it involves a 
careful assessment of the optimal level at which decisions should be taken. Instead of a preference for lower levels of 
government, this does imply a proper cost-benefit analysis of (de)centralisation.  
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2  Fiscal Federalism: the basics 
The economic arguments that guide the debate on subsidiarity are rooted in the theory of fiscal 
federalism
2. The economic theory of fiscal federalism explores when centralisation of public 
economic functions is welfare improving. This theory finds its foundation in the paper of 
Musgrave (1959) in which he discusses the optimal level of centralisation of several public 
economic functions. The basic or first generation (according to Oates, 2005) theory of fiscal 
federalism explores the trade-off between preference matching and internalisation of 
interjurisdictional external effects or economies of scale. To arrive at this trade-off, section 2.1 
presents the assumptions on government behaviour that underlie the standard model, section 2.2 
focuses on preference matching as a motive for decentralisation and section 2.3 turns to the 
motives for centralisation. Section 2.4 then discusses a functional subsidiarity test to determine 
the optimal assignment of competences within the European Union.  
2.1  Government behaviour  
The point of departure is a region, which consists of a number of jurisdictions. A clear example 
is a federation, such a Germany, or the EU and the member states, which is the topic of this 
paper. The government provides a public good. Then the principal question is whether the 
centralised government (EU) or the local governments (the member states) should supply the 
public goods. The basic theory as elaborated in Oates (1972) is based on three main 
assumptions on the behaviour of governments: 
1.  Benevolent and perfect government 
Each level of government maximises the welfare of its constituency. This implies that different 
layers of government always act benevolently. They do not pursue their own interest or fall 
victim to lobby groups. Moreover, policy design involves no transaction costs or costs of policy 
learning. 
2.  Policy uniformity  
The central government provides a uniform level of a public good in all jurisdictions. This 
assumption is not straightforward.
3 A perfectly informed central planner would be able to 
provide public goods in each jurisdiction according to local preferences or local needs. Two 
motives underlie policy uniformity (Oates, 2005, p353). Firstly, information gathering comes at 
a cost and central governments face higher costs to learn the preferences of local constituencies 
 
2 Fiscal policy was the main topic of research in the original literature. Although economic federalism would be a more 
accurate description nowadays, ‘fiscal federalism’ has become the accepted term and therefore we will use this here. In the 
EU-context the theory is also referred to as the theory of multi-tier or multi-layer government. 
3  With the great heterogeneity in the European Union, policy uniformity is often far from optimal (see e.g. CESifo, 2003, for 
an illustrative example of these problems).   16 
compared to local governments. Secondly, central government faces political constraints to treat 
one jurisdiction more generous than another.  
3.  Centralised decision making 
 Each level of government acts as a central planner. This implies that the highest level of 
government consists of a president or small executive council (the central planner) elected by 
all citizens of the union. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997, 2002) refer to this form of federalism as 
economic or centralised federalism. 
 
2.2  Decentralisation: preference matching 
In the standard model the principal motive for decentralisation follows from the diversity of 
preferences for public goods in jurisdictions. Both preferences for public goods and 
circumstances that affect the demand for public goods differ widely in jurisdictions. Concerning 
preferences, countries may have different views on the role of the government and on the need 
for centralisation or decentralisation (compare Box). Alesina and Perotti (2004) emphasize the 
distinction in Europe between the dirigiste attitude, characterised by heavy government 
intervention in markets, and the more laissez-faire Anglo-American attitude. Cultural 
characteristics may underlie this diversity of preferences (compare Dekker et al., 2006). In 
addition, European countries differ in physical conditions, sectoral structure, infrastructure, etc. 
This may affect the emphasis they put on different public goods. For instance, countries with a 
large agricultural sector may attach a higher weight to agricultural policies than other countries. 
As an other example, a country with a large transport sector benefits relatively more from 
investment in infrastructure. Hence, diversity in endowments may result in diversity in weights 
attached to specific goals of economic policy. 
 
When preferences differ over jurisdictions, preference matching is the main motive for 
decentralisation. Combining the assumptions on policy making in the previous section with the 
likelihood of preference heterogeneity, Oates (1972, p.54) derived formally the so-called 
decentralisation theorem. The intuition behind the decentralisation theorem is that except in the 
extreme case that preferences across jurisdictions are the same everywhere, decentralisation will 
bring welfare gains as outputs can be diversified in accordance with local preferences and 
conditions. Preference matching as a motive for decentralisation has to be weighted against the 
motives for centralisation, which are the subject of the next section. 
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Preference heterogeneity 
Between European countries there may be considerable differences in preferences. The table below, adapted from 
Dekker and Ederveen (2005), shows how strong opinions differ over the desirability of a common European policy 
between the current 25 member states of the European Union. In general the Scandinavian countries least favour 
further integration, whereas the new member states generally show the highest preference for common European 
policies in different areas. 
 
Preferences for European policy in the 25 member states of the European Union, 2004, (unweighted) averages 
of the national percentages of the population aged 15 and over and deviations by the countries from this 
average in percentage points
a 
   EU-25  Min  Country  Max  Country  NL 
             
The war against international terrorism  90  80  UK  95  LT  94 
Scientific and technological research  76  52  DE  93  CY  76 
The war against drugs  75  56  LU  87  PL  68 
Foreign policy towards countries outside the EU  73  58  SE  83  BE  78 
Humanitarian aid  72  43  SE  83  LT  73 
Aid to regions with economic problems  68  41  FR  83  PL  64 
Environmental protection  67  46  FI  82  PL  73 
Tackling poverty and social exclusion  61  47  DK  76  LT, CY  47 
Defence  57  13  FI  78  LV  64 
Immigration policy  57  29  FI  82  LT  59 
Agriculture and fisheries policy  53  20  FI  71  CY  65 
Tackling unemployment  52  30  FI  73  LT  40 
Tackling the problem of ageing  51  22  SE  80  CY  30 
Admission of refugees  52  22  FI  74  ES  50 
Education  39  21  FI  58  LT  27 
Health and social security  37  7  FI  70  CY  22 
Justice  37  14  DK  70  LT  33 
Elementary guidelines for radio, TV and press  34  15  DK  56  CY  26 
Cultural policy  32  15  SE  51  ES  22 
Police  30  13  SE  50  ES  22 
             
Preference for European policy: average  56  38  FI  71  LT  52 
  a
 For each of the following areas, can you tell me whether you consider decisions should be taken by the [national] government or 
within the European Union? A total of 27 policy areas and topics were submitted to respondents, of which 20 are shown here. ‘Don’t 
know’ answers have been left out. Example of how to read table: on average 90% of the population in the member states considers that 
the war against international terrorism should be tackled in the European context; in the United Kingdom the figure is 80% and in the 
Netherlands 94%. 
Source: Eurobarometer 62.0 (October-November 2004); weighted results.    
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2.3  Centralisation: cross-border externalities and scale 
Cross-border externalities and economies of scale are the two main motives that may call for 
centralisation (Oates, 2005). In the EU cross-border externalities arise when a national policy 
of a member state has consequences for another member state that are not taken into account in 
its decision making process. These externalities can both be positive or negative. Investments in 
Research and Development (R&D) provide an example of possible positive externalities. When 
Germany doubles its investments in R&D, other countries, especially the neighbours, could 
benefit from the spread of knowledge (Ederveen et al., 2005). However, these potential benefits 
are not taken into account by Germany when it decides about its level of investment. Therefore, 
from an efficiency point of view countries will generally invest too little in policies that 
generate positive spillovers. In the same vein it could be argued that policies that create 
negative spillovers will be overrepresented. An example is cross-border pollution. Higher levels 
of government can internalise both negative and positive externalities. This could justify the 
centralisation of a certain policy. 
Economies of scale provide another rationale for centralisation. When policies are costly, 
especially due to fixed costs, decentralised policy making is bound to be suboptimal. In such a 
case, centralised policies could improve welfare. An example is CERN, the particle physics 
laboratory near Geneva that is supported by many European countries. 
 
2.4  The functional subsidiarity test 
Combing the motives for centralisation and decentralisation results in the following trade-off:  
 
  Decentralisation     Centralisation 
  preference matching  <=>   cross-border externalities  
          economies of scale 
 
Given a certain degree of preference heterogeneity, centralisation is only desirable when 
externalities or economies of scale are sufficiently large.
4 Based on this principal trade-off 
between preference matching versus scale and cross-border externalities, Pelkmans (2006) 
derives a functional subsidiarity test. The general test consists of the following three steps:
5 Is 
centralisation justified by the existence of economies of scale and/or externalities? 
 
 
4 Formally larger externalities imply more centralisation, but more preference heterogeneity does not necessarily imply less 
centralisation. This is because more heterogeneity may not only raise the social costs under centralisation, but may also 
raise the costs of inefficient provision of public goods when externalities are not taken into account under decentralisation 
(Besley and Coate, 2003, p2616).  
5 Pelkmans (2006) includes another step which determines whether the policy falls in the area of shared competences. To 
make the test more general, i.e. not bound by the treaty’s text, we exclude this step here.   19 
•  Is credible voluntary cooperation possible? 
•  If the answer on the first question is yes, and on the second no, then the (proper) assignment is 
at the EU level. The third question then is that of proportionality: To what degree should the 
implementation and enforcement be centralised as well and can policies be designed in a cost- 
minimising manner ? 
 
When economies of scale or cross-border externalities exist, the first step, the need-to-act-in-
common test is passed. Still there is no need for centralisation, if all Member States would 
voluntarily cooperate on a given policy issue and this cooperation is credible. Credibility is an 
important criterion to decide upon centralisation or decentralisation. When credibility is low, 
cooperation will be unsustainable and a central policy is needed. Credibility will be particularly 
low when information is highly imperfect or asymmetrically distributed, especially in complex 
policy areas, because this renders it impossible to monitor compliance. Credibility is also low 
when the incentives to cheat are strong and the ability or willingness to impose collective 
sanctions is perceived as minimal. If voluntary cooperation cannot come about, or it would not 
be credible, there is a case for centralisation. 
When there is a case for centralisation, it has to be decided how it should be implemented, 
monitored and enforced. This is the third and last step of the test. Here the question of 
proportionality is relevant: no more than what is necessary to achieve the goals of the actions 
should be done at the central level. Where possible and efficient, member states should play the 
primary role in policy implementation. Therefore, in principle coordination and 
recommendations are preferred over legislation (compare the box in section 4 on EU economic 
governance). If binding measures are needed anyhow, directives should be considered before 
EC regulations. In this way maximal discretion is left to the member states, while internalising 
the cross-border externalities. 
 
The test described above is a purely functional test of subsidiarity. Such a test is indispensable 
for a proper assessment of the assignment decision. However, it is certainly not the full story. 
The trade-off between preference matching and cross-border externalities or economies of scale 
is derived under a set of rather strict assumptions regarding the political process. If one wishes 
to understand the subsidiarity debate in the EU, the political perspectives should also be taken 
into account. Relaxing the assumptions of section 2.1 yields a more realistic and at the same 
time more complex view of the choice between decentralisation and centralisation. That is the 
subject matter of the next sections. 
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3  Government imperfections 
Dropping assumption 1 of benevolent and perfect governments, imperfections in policy 
formulation come to the fore. Pelkmans (2006) distinguishes two well-known cases of 
government failure: Leviathan and lobby. A Leviathan government pursues its own interests in 
contrast to the public interest. Self-interested governments may exist on a local level and on a 
central level. Therefore, sections 3.1 and 3.2 review the consequences of Leviathan 
governments in the member states and the EU, respectively. Successful lobbying may result in 
governments being captured by organised interest groups. This is the subject of section 3.3. As 
a third case, policy design may be characterised by imperfections. Also when governments do 
not deliberately pursue their own interest, they still may struggle with policy formulation. 
Section 3.4 turns to the issue of (de-)centralisation when policy design is a learning process, 
which requires appropriate and sufficient incentives to take place effectively. Section 3.5 
addresses complementarities between policy fields, which may create dependencies between 
centralisation decisions over policy fields. Finally section 3.6 touches upon second best 
arguments that may ask for centralisation to correct failures of decentralisation, or vice versa. 
3.1  Leviathan in the member states 
Decentralisation may contain Leviathan either through stronger opportunities for citizens to 
control government (voice) or through the exit option: voting with their feet. In the latter case 
citizens leave jurisdictions with Leviathan governments for jurisdictions with more reliable 
governments or policies closer to their preferences. As Tiebout (1956) showed, competition 
among local regions is welfare improving for society as a whole, as the resulting heterogeneity 
allows citizens to move to the region that reflects their preferences with respect to taxes and 
public goods best. However, mobility of labour between European countries is not that large, so 
voice would be the most important mechanism (Pelkmans, 2006).  
In addition, decentralisation enhances policy competition (Tabellini and Wyplosz, 2004). 
One of its benefits may be to contain Leviathan governments. For instance, if governments have 
distorted incentives to increase spending and taxation, tax competition may raise welfare. Inter-
regional competition also forces governments to provide services efficiently. Hence 
decentralised provision of public goods and the resulting competition may alleviate government 
failure.  
These arguments pro decentralisation add accountability to the decentralisation side of the 
trade-off. Because they are more responsive to ‘voice’ and because they are constrained by 
policy competition, decentralised governments are more accountable to their constituents. With 
Leviathan governments ‘decentralisation may be preferable even in cases of perfect 
homogeneity of preferences across local jurisdictions’ (Oates, 2005, p358).    22 
Adding this motive for decentralisation, a trade-off arises between on the one hand preference 
matching and accountability as arguments for decentralisation and on the other hand 
externalities and increasing returns as arguments for centralisation: 
 
  Decentralisation     Centralisation 
  preference matching  <=>   cross-border externalities  
  accountability      economies of scale 
  
Applying the trade-off to concrete policies, the drawbacks of policy competition should be 
taken into account. An expanding literature argues that policy competition has its limits as a 
way to contain Leviathan and to improve the efficiency of policy making. Sinn (2003) states 
that the so-called selection principle fetters policy competition. National governments intervene 
in the economy to counter market failures. Yet, according to the selection principle, competition 
between governments through the backdoor may bring back the market failures national 
policies were meant to resolve. For instance, competitive states may have an incentive to 
promote national champions, which may be at odds with national competition laws. Moreover, 
policy competition lacks price signals that guide competition on the market. Hence, if market 
failures manifest themselves on an international scale, policy competition between countries 
may be a blunt instrument to enhance the quality of policies and institutions. 
Finally, to some extent centralisation may enhance policy competition. For instance, EU 
coordination may enhance regulatory competition, when countries strongly monitor each other 
on the way they comply with the internal market directives (Pelkmans, 2006). 
3.2  Leviathan in Brussels 
In the context of the EU, government failure may arise, if the Commission pursues overly 
centralistic policies and is able to implement these.
6 For instance, Pollack (2003, p16) in an 
empirical study on delegation in Europe concludes: ‘Despite their internal complexity and 
diversity, EU supranational agents generally behave like unitary actors with preference for 
further integration’. To display that behaviour, the Commission should have both incentives for 
centralisation and sufficient discretion to achieve centralisation.  
Incentives may come from a relatively pro-centralisation stance of people working at the 
Commission. Through self selection people applying for a job at the Commission may be above 
average pro centralisation. Socialisation during their working life with European ideals and 
interests may add to this attitude. Of course bureaucratic policies may also play a role, such as 
expanding the power of directorates. Finally, national governments may delegate people with a 
 
6 This argument can also be exaggerated. National governments can use the EU as a crowbar or scapegoat to convince 
their constituency that unpleasant policies are unavoidable. Recent experiences in some member states have shown that 
such a strategy may ricochet in undermining the public support for European coordination.  
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relatively pro centralisation mind-set to counter time inconsistency (Majone, 2001, 112). The 
reason is that national governments know that they may have short run incentives to renege on 
their commitment to European integration. Delegation to the EU level solves this only if the 
preferences of the delegates do not simply mirror those of the delegating authority. Otherwise 
delegated EU officials would give in to the same short-run incentives as national governments.  
Discretion of the Commission to promote centralist policies depends on its agenda setting 
capabilities and on monitoring and control activities by member state governments. Agenda 
setting may be formal and informal (Pollack, 2003, p47). Formal agenda setting implies the 
right to set the procedural agenda and initiate legislative proposals. The formal agenda setting 
power of the Commission is greatest when it has the sole right of initiative and when its 
proposal can more easily be adopted than amended. Informal agenda setting concerns 
influencing the member states and having them make proposals that comply with the interest of 
the Commission.  
Control and EU institutions 
Analogous functional separation within the Commission and the relevant Council formations may weaken control by 
member states. Both Commission Directorates-General and Council formations are organised along comparable policy 
areas. For instance, in the Ecofin Council DG Ecfin and Ministries of Finance meet; in the Employment, Social Policy, 
Health  and  Consumer  Affairs  Council  the  same  applies  to  DG  Employment  and  Ministries  of  Social  Affairs  and 
Employment. Each Council formation operates in relative isolation and discuss issues relevant to their policy area from 
their  perspective.  Exceptions  are  the  Competitiveness  Council  and  the  European  Council  of  heads  of  state  and 
government. In particular the later Council would be able to provide an overall view and exercise countervailing power, 
because  almost  all  proposals  of  Council  formations  have  to  be  approved  by  the  European  Council.  However,  the 
European  Council  discusses  only  controversial  guidelines  at  length,  it  endorses  many  proposals  from  Council 
formations without much review. 
 
Free rider problems and diverging interests among member states may hamper monitoring and 
control by member states. The free-rider problem is well-known in principal agent models with 
multiple principals (the member states) and costly monitoring of an agent (the Commission). 
Each principal faces an incentive to avoid monitoring and control costs and to free ride on 
activities by other principals. Diversity among principals enables the agent to exploit different 
or even conflicting preferences. In some cases it may use some kind of ‘divide and rule’ 
strategy. That may enable the Commission to reach its goals through selectively addressing 
member states that may oppose its proposals (Scharpf, 1999, p69).
7 The Commission may first 
address a single member state, for instance by acting against protectionism or state support. If it 
succeeds (in court) that may reduce opposition by other member states. Moreover, the country 
that lost its case is likely to become an ally of the Commission. If it has been convinced or 
forced to act unilaterally and expects to be at a disadvantage to other countries that have not 
 
7 Successfully pursuing such a strategy requires a strong legal base.   24 
acted yet, it will side with the Commission in proposing a general directive that applies to all 
member states.  
The efficacy of control also depends on the institutional setting of an agent (Pollack, 2003, 
p44). An agent’s room for manoeuvre is greatest when the decision rule for the application of 
sanctions is most demanding (unanimity among principals). Also relevant is the default 
condition in the event of no agreement among principals. If it is status quo, i.e. continuation of 
already existing institutions and policies, sanctioning becomes more difficult.  
 
This section has shown that EU government failure may arise if monitoring and control by 
lower level authorities is unsuccessful. For specific policy fields policies may become overly 
centralistic, depending on agenda setting capabilities of the Commission, on the diversity of 
views among member states and on the default condition when member states disagree. 
3.3  Lobby 
Lobbying is an other case of government failure. Governments always risk to become captured 
by interest groups. That risk exists both at the national level and at the EU level. The theoretical 
literature does not unequivocally support the ‘traditional intuition that local government is more 
susceptible to capture by lobbies’ (Lockwood, 2005). Among others, it depends on whether 
citizens are better informed at the central level or at the local level and on the strength of the 
lobby at each level. Moreover, it may be more cost effective to lobby central policy makers, 
because that involves less players.  
Furthermore, lobbying may influence the decision to centralise. In some cases capture may 
prevent beneficial centralisation. Pelkmans (2006) gives the example of national interest groups 
that through national governments obstruct internal market liberalisation. In contrast, with 
reference to the common agricultural policy he also illustrates that national interests may 
prompt centralisation.  
Tabellini and Wyplosz (2004) argue that the impact of decentralisation or centralisation on 
the efficacy of lobby’s depends on whether the objectives of domestic and foreign interest 
groups are aligned or not. If interests coincide, centralisation means that the foreign lobby 
obtains an additional channel to influence the domestic government. For instance, through 
centralisation domestic producers lobbying for low consumer rights or limited environmental 
protection may find support from foreign producer interest groups. Yet foreign interests may 
also oppose domestic interests, in which case centralisation weakens the efficacy of lobby 
activities. Foreign producers would lobby against domestic producers that attempt to create 
barriers to entry on domestic markets.  
All in all, the impact of lobbying on the trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation 
is indeterminate. It depends on the specific conditions in a given policy area whether a central 
or a local government faces a higher risk of being captured.    25 
3.4  Policy learning 
Imperfections in policy design may result from difficulties with policy learning. At times 
governments face considerable challenges to devise adequate measures in complex policy 
fields, like for instance intricate transitions in network industries. Even a government that 
honestly pursues the common good, may not be knowledgeable or creative enough to devise the 
most suitable policies or may be slow in picking up signals from society that reform measures 
are needed, because institutions have become outdated.  
Decentralisation may stimulate policy learning. Decentralisation creates diversity in policy, 
which yields experiences with policy in one jurisdiction that may benefit another. In that way 
decentralisation facilitates experimentation and creates possibilities for mutual learning. Of 
course learning only takes places when jurisdictions are aware of experiences in other 
jurisdictions and have an incentive to heed these experiences. 
One of the intentions of the open method of coordination (OMC) is to enhance this kind of 
policy learning. Member states benefit from experiences in other member states through soft 
coordination at the EU level (see the box in section 4 for the position of the OMC in EU 
governance). Under the Lisbon strategy the OMC is applied to a broad range of policy fields, 
ranging from labour markets and welfare states to education and innovation. The method 
consists of identifying common objectives for national policy, devising associated performance 
indicators, drafting policy proposals in National Reform Programmes and mutual assessment of 
these programmes in EU committees. 
In principle the OMC seems geared to policy learning, even so whether learning really takes 
place depends on the effectiveness of the OMC. Here the jury is still out. An important 
consequence of this form of soft coordination is that incentives to change policies are soft as 
well (Sapir et al., 2004). In the recent reform of the Lisbon strategy the focus is on ‘delivering’, 
with the discussion of National Reform Programmes in member state’s parliaments as one of 
the measures to intensify incentives for action. Empirical evidence on the impact of the OMC 
on policy learning is still limited and yields mixed results (Ederveen et al., 2005). The most 
successful empirical results pertain to evidence about convergence of ideas (Radaelli, 2003).  
In summary, decentralisation may enhance policy learning through experimentation, which 
on a higher level can be strengthened by information exchange and building commitment. In 
that respect, a trade-off does not exist: decentralisation and centralisation are complementary. 
However, the inherent soft coordination due to primarily national responsibility for policy 
decisions, generates weak incentives for policy learning. 
3.5  Complementarities 
Complementarities across policies domains may affect the assessment of subsidiarity. 
Complementarities imply that a move towards centralisation or decentralisation in one   26 
dimension increases the benefit of moving in the same direction in other dimensions. For 
instance, EMU initiated the discussion about the Stability and Growth Pact, because centralising 
monetary policy affected the costs and benefits of fiscal centralisation (Persson et al., 1996). 
EMU also provides a rationale for coordinating reforms among euro area countries (Pisani-
Ferry, 2005). The reason is that in a monetary union, a country that pursues reforms exerts an 
effect on its EMU partners, because the European Central Bank will adjust the interest rate in 
response. As an other example, liberalisation brings policy areas within the confines of the 
internal market that previously were delivered by national public providers. 
Because of complementarities the decision to centralise policy in a specific field may have 
farther reaching consequences than initially recognized. Once a first step has been taken other 
policy domains may follow suit. Therefore, a full cost benefit analysis of centralisation would 
have to include both the initial and the complementary policy fields. Another possibility is that 
complementarities create deadlocks. Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2006) give the example of 
complementarities between product market reforms and labour market reforms: ‘a combination 
of product market regulations that aim at favouring entry and of labour market regulations that 
aim at preserving existing jobs is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Hence, when assessing 
subsidiarity, possible complementary policy domains should be taken into consideration as 
well.  
3.6  Second best 
Government imperfections introduce second-best arguments in the deliberations. Those 
arguments can tip the balance between centralisation and decentralisation: (de-)centralisation 
can be welfare improving although it was not in the absence of distortions.  
Persson et al. (1996) emphasize this point and give the example of education. Because 
economies of scale and cross-border externalities of education are not very high (see Thissen 
and Ederveen, 2006), educational policy should be decentralised according to the functional 
subsidiarity test in section 2.4. However, Persson et al. (1996) state: ‘ Many observers take the 
view that national university systems are poorly organised and inefficient (particularly in 
comparison with the US), because sectoral and regional interests have led to inefficient 
regulation and to a poor allocation of government budgets’. In that case EU policies that 
promote mobility of students and researchers, may increase competition between European 
universities and may enhance efficiency and quality of education and research.  
Hence, centralisation may be warranted to reduce government failures at the national level. 
The opposite case is possible as well: decentralisation may be advisable to counter government 
failure at the EU level (see section 3.2).   27 
4  Decision making in legislature 
The analysis above assumes that decisions in the union are being taken by a central planner, 
such as a president or executive council, elected by all people in the union. Abstracting from 
that assumption introduces the possibility of conflicts of interest at the centralised level that 
negatively affect decision making. These drawbacks reduce the benefits of centralisation and 
may shift the trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation towards decentralisation.  
Abandoning the assumption of a central planner, it matters how the decision making process 
is organised at the centralised level. This section takes the perspective that regional delegates 
form a legislature, which makes decisions.
8 As such it relaxes assumption 3 from section 2.1. At 
the same time also assumption 2 of policy uniformity is dropped, to create the possibility that 
representatives engage in centralised policies that specifically benefit their regions of origin. 
Moreover, policy heterogeneity can be observed in practice. Frequently in federal systems a 
central government differentiates the provision of public goods over jurisdictions (Besley and 
Coate, 2003).
9  
In their paper on subsidiarity Inman and Rubinfeld (2002) distinguish two alternatives for 
economic or centralised federalism, the central planner from section 2.1. In cooperative or 
decentralised federalism representatives of the member states’ governments unanimously 
decide on central government (union) policies. In democratic or majority-rule federalism 
representatives of the member states decide on central policies by (simple) majority rule. 
Inman and Rubinfeld (2002) argue that European governance changed from decentralised 
federalism via centralised federalisms towards democratic or majority-rule federalism 
nowadays. Initially under the Treaty of Rome (1957) decentralised federalism characterised the 
Union: the powerful Council of Ministers voted with unanimity on major issues. The Single 
European Act of 1986 shifted the institutional structure towards centralised federalism. 
Replacing the rule of unanimity by a consultation procedure considerably increased agenda 
setting powers of the executive, the Commission. Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty and the 
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the co-decision procedure put the European Parliament on equal 
footing with the Council of Ministers. By consequence, today the Union consists of an 
institutionally weak executive without veto powers together with two equally powerful bodies 
(Council and Parliament), ‘each capable of blocking the preferred outcomes of the other’ 
(Inman and Rubinfeld, 2002, p9). This most closely fits in with democratic federalism. 
 
8 This extends the original theory by focussing on political processes, the behaviour of political agents and distortions arising 
from asymmetric information. Oates (2005) refers to these extensions as being part of the second generation theory of fiscal 
federalism. 
9 The two assumptions have to be combined, because centralisation would always be preferable when discarding policy 
uniformity while keeping central planning  (see section 2.1).   28 
EU economic governance 
Sapir et al. (2004) distinguish four types of governance arrangements in the European Union: 
 
•  Full delegation of policies to the Union, such as trade policy (internal market, WTO) or competition policy. 
•  Binding commitment among member states. In this case member states have agreed on EU surveillance and EU 
sanctions for policies that remain their ultimate responsibility. An example is state aid oversight by the Commission. 
•  Coordination of policies that are decided and implemented by the member states. Coordination covers: 
•  explicit guidelines subject to multilateral surveillance (Broad Economic Policy Guidelines) 
•  collective rules (Single Market regulations) 
•  high-level dialogue (Eurogroup) 
•  mutual information and assessment (Open Method of Coordination) 
•  Autonomy of member states to decide on and implement policies, for instance in the field of direct taxation.  
 
Over  time  a  shift  has  taken  place  from  delegation  (internal market,  EMU)  to commitment  and coordination,  which 
features prominently in the Lisbon strategy. Comparing the internal market and the Lisbon strategy Sapir et al. (2004) 
conclude: ‘Narrow intermediate objectives, precisely defines means and effective instruments have been replaced by 
broader objectives, softer means and weaker instruments’.  
 
The following subsections treat two main consequences of decision making in a legislature. 
Section 4.1 touches upon an attitude of deference in the legislature towards each others’ 
proposals. Section 4.2 covers possible conflicts of interest in the legislature. Section 4.3 turns to 
the effects of deference and conflicts of interest on the trade-of between centralisation and 
decentralisation.  
 
4.1  Deference in negotiations 
Decision making in a legislature requires negotiations between national representatives about 
the kind of policies to be addressed at the central level. In single issue bargaining the decision to 
centralise a policy depends on the bargaining power of countries and on the differences in 
weights that individual countries attach to that policy and to centralisation. In practice 
negotiations take place in a setting of multiple goals and repeated games. In the European 
Council national governments continuously negotiate about a broad range of policies. In those 
cases ‘allowing’ centralisation on one specific policy may act as a kind of side payment to 
obtain support from countries with low weights on centralisation for other policies. In 
particular, if one country attaches a large weight to a specific policy, the other countries may 
allow centralisation on that specific policy. On the one hand this may facilitate finding a 
solution when a minority strongly opposes a certain policy proposal. Yet, on the other hand this 
process may ‘get out of hand’. If all countries try to lever their national policies by lifting them 
to a European level, the process of deference may result in centralisation on policies that would 
not pass a subsidiarity test.    29 
The risk of deference in particular applies to democratic federalism, the current system of 
decision making in the EU. Majority rule decision making is inherently instable. It may cycle 
from one majority to another without reaching an equilibrium. To cope with instability, member 
states may revert to the “I’ll-scratch-your-back-if-you-scratch-mine” legislative norm of 
deference to make decisions. ‘Under this norm locally beneficial but centrally inefficient 
government policies will be approved’ (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2002, p7).  
The negotiation process among countries may also manifest itself in an overly detailed 
system of coordination. For instance, in 1997 France refused to sign the Stability and Growth 
Pact unless the EU would also start an employment strategy. Over time the employment 
strategy evolved into 18 employment guidelines in four pillars (employability, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability of business and employees and equal opportunities). An elaborate EU system of 
guidelines, recommendations and committees may be at odds with the proportionality principle. 
An other consequence of deference may be that countries formulate rather broad and vague 
goals or policies, so as not to interfere with each other’s domestic policies. That may either give 
much autonomy to central institutions to define the policy actions. Or, more probable, it may 
reduce the effectiveness of common policies, because it is unclear what is really meant. In 
particular when countries put each other to the test in a process of peer review, vague phrases 
may be a way out. Guidelines for individual member states frequently contain phrases such as 
‘promote more adaptable and innovative work organisation’ or clauses like ‘where appropriate’. 
According to Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2006) the mid-term revitalisation of the Lisbon 
strategy did not succeed in solving these problems. Resistance by the large member states 
against naming and shaming had country specific guidelines replaced by ‘no less than’ 24 
general guidelines. Each of these guidelines is being applied to all member states, without 
distinguishing whether some may be more relevant for a country than others. 
4.2  Conflicts of interest: common pool problems 
Discarding policy uniformity (assumption 2 in section 2.1), conflicts of interest are an important 
reason why centralisation may be at odds with preference matching. Representatives in the 
legislature are primarily answerable to voters in their constituency or region and care less about 
voters in other regions (Lockwood, 2005). Depending on the modelling of the voting process 
and bargaining in legislation, the literature identifies several consequences of these conflicts of 
interest. 
An important drawback of centralisation under democratic federalism is common pool 
budgeting or raiding the commons (Inman and Rubinfeld; 2002, Oates, 2005). Member states 
have an incentive to draw as much as possible on the common budget for projects that locally 
provide benefits. In that way other states co-finance these projects, whereas the benefits mainly 
accrue to local constituents. EU agricultural policy, cohesion policy and structural funds come   30 
to mind here. When considering independent taxation capabilities at the EU level, common pool 
problems have to be taken into account as well (Rattso, 2003).  
The common pool problem also creates a bias in the selection of projects funded by the 
legislature (Lockwood, 2002, 2005). When there is cost sharing (for instance through the 
current GDP-proportional contributions to the EU budget) the legislature has an incentive to 
minimise the costs of projects, not to maximise their net welfare gains when these are unevenly 
distributed among member states. The reason is that all member states benefit from cost 
reductions, whereas only one or a few member states reap the economic surplus of the projects. 
To some extent this effect may offset the deference problem that creates a bias towards projects 
beneficial to individual member states (see section 4.1).  
Finally, cost sharing of local public goods may induce over-provision of public goods in a 
centralised system (Besley and Coate, 2003). Cost sharing creates an incentive for local voters 
to strategically delegate by electing representatives with high demand for public spending. If 
one region elects a delegate to the legislature who places high value on the public good, this 
delegate will be more aggressive in demanding a higher public good for that region. That 
benefits citizens from that region, because part of the costs is borne by the other regions. But if 
all regions act that way the total amount of public goods will be higher than their efficient 
levels. In contrast to the previous project selection effect, strategic delegation may exacerbate 
the deference problem. 
 
4.3  A shifting trade-off 
Democratic federalism introduces several inefficiencies associated with centralisation. An 
attitude of deference among the representatives in the legislature may result in approval of 
inefficient policies and projects, such as transfers that benefit specific regions. Common pool 
problems may also lead to over-supply of public goods at the central level. In contrast, the 
project selection effect associated with cost sharing may make the central government less 
sensitive to tastes of the regions. Moreover, in these political economy models of fiscal 
federalism it is not generally true that the higher the cross-border externalities the higher the 
welfare gain from centralisation (Lockwood, 2002). 
Institutional solutions to these inefficiencies are hard to reach. An option is to reform the 
legislative process, for instance by increasing the power of the Parliament or giving veto rights 
to the executive (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997, p52; 2002, p7). That will be a rather delicate topic 
in the context of the EU. Alternatively, adjustment of the institutions of federalism might 
change the system of direct representation of member states. In that case groups of local 
jurisdictions would elect one representative, which might reduce deference. However this 
comes at the cost of less preference revelation: one representative has to internalise all 
preferences of several jurisdictions.    31 
With institutional solutions out of reach, these drawbacks of centralisation have to be taken into 
account when contemplating centralisation of a specific policy or not. In some cases inefficient 
centralised policies may not outweigh the benefits of internalising cross-border externalities or 
achieving economies of scale. For instance, considering an independent taxation authority for 
the Union, Rattso (2003) states that an intermediate situation of broad fiscal responsibilities 
together with a weak centre is the worst case. It is inferior both to the current situation of a 
weak centre with limited fiscal authority and the alternative of a politically strong centre with a 
broad fiscal mandate. Hence, subsidiarity assessment has to take into account these weaknesses 
of centralisation related to the political process of decision making in the Union.  
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5  Dynamics affect the centralisation trade-off 
European integration is a dynamic process. The optimal level of centralisation in the Union may 
shift over time. In the past various developments, such as increasing pressure on the 
environment, have called for a coordinated response. In the future several trends (see De Mooij 
and Tang, 2003) may affect the balance between centralisation and decentralisation in Europe.  
Globalisation is a case in point. Increasing interdependencies in international trade may raise 
the weight of a common European position in WTO negotiations. Stronger foreign direct 
investment can increase cross-border externalities when countries try to attract subsidiaries of 
multinational companies. Large migration flows might affect the spillovers of income taxation 
and social policy. If labour mobility within the EU increases, the assessment of subsidiarity 
regarding European coordination of immigration policy might be affected. Although at present 
there are no signs that labour mobility in Europe will rise substantially, one important reason for 
this low mobility seems to be the barriers that the European Union itself maintains. Indeed, as 
long as labour mobility is trivial, the possible spillovers won’t be relevant either.  
Over time the trends may affect the trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation. 
They may intensify (diminish) external effects and economies of scale and thus may add to 
(limit) motives for EU policies. Or they may affect other aspects of the trade-off, such as lobby 
intensity or government failures. As is discussed in section 3.5, complementarities may call for 
centralisation in a specific policy field, once another has been centralised. The creation of the 
European Monetary Union and its implications for other policy areas is a case in point. 
Furthermore, the decision making process in the European Union is subject to changes. When 
the decision making process is altered, the assessment of subsidiarity may shift for specific 
policies, for instance because government failures manifest themselves in another way. The 
bottom-line of this discussion is that assessing subsidiarity is no static exercise. 
Finally, the dynamic process may be asymmetric. Although theoretically it is no problem to 
change the degree and form of centralisation, in practice a decision to centralise certain policies 
in the European Union may be hard to reverse. That means the decision to centralise has to be 
taken with care not to loose the option value of waiting.    34   35 
6  Conclusion: assessing subsidiarity 
This paper has presented many arguments that relate to the degree of centralisation of policies 
in the European Union. Table 6.1 presents an overview. The table starts with the basic trade-off 
that underlies the functional subsidiarity test from section 2.4. In that trade-off centralisation is 
warranted when increasing returns or cross-border externalities outweigh preference matching.  
Table 6.1  Subsidiarity: motives for decentralisation and centralisation 
  Decentralisation  Centralisation 
     
Functional test  Preference matching  Increasing returns 
    Cross-border externalities 
 
Political economy 
Leviathan  Accountability, policy competition  Effective monitoring by member states 
Lobby  Aligned objectives of lobby groups  Contrasting objectives of lobby groups 
Policy learning  Experimentation  Information exchange, commitment for reform 
Second best  Offset centralised government failure   Offset decentralised government failure  
     
Deference  Prevent over-provision of public goods   
Common pool  Prevent raiding the commons   
     
Dynamics     
Trends  ----------------------------------------    Affect motives over time   ------------------------------------------- 
Dynamic process  Centralisation may be irreversible   
 
The table shows that several political economy motives affect the assessment of subsidiarity as 
well. Decentralisation provides opportunities for citizens to make governments more 
accountable to their preferences, which together with policy competition may discipline 
Leviathan governments in member states. Effective monitoring by member states may counter 
government failures at the EU level and in that way supports centralisation. The sensitivity to 
lobbying depends on whether objectives of domestic and foreign interest groups are aligned or 
contrasting. If they are contrasting, centralised policies are less affected by lobbying. Policy 
learning benefits from experimentation among decentralised authorities and from information 
exchange and commitment building at a central level. Centralisation may be useful to offset 
local government failures and vice versa. Finally, concerning decision making at the centralised 
level two main risks have been identified. Overprovision of locally beneficial public goods may 
result, when decision making takes place under a norm of deference. Common pool problems 
arise, when member states take advantage of the common budget. Hence, decentralisation may 
prevent these inefficiencies of centralised decision making.  
All these considerations may have dynamic aspects as well. Trends may imply that the 
subsidiary assessment of tomorrow differs from that of today. In addition, centralisation is often 
practically irreversible. 
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What general picture do all these pro’s and con’s yield? Clearly, the basic trade-off occupies an 
essential place in the assessment of subsidiarity. Any serious assessment of subsidiarity has to 
start with identifying the existence of increasing returns and cross-border externalities and 
weighing them against the heterogeneity in the member states. This functional subsidiarity test 
remains an indispensable tool to make the main arguments pro and contra centralisation 
explicit.  
However, there may be good reasons for the final subsidiarity test to differ from the 
functional one. Analysing political decision making is important to further understand the trade-
off between centralisation and decentralisation (see Besley and Coate, 2003). At the same time 
allowing for government imperfections and political economy considerations, makes it difficult 
to draw general normative conclusions on the appropriate degree of centralisation (compare 
Persson et al., 1996). Because all considerations are case specific, issues of subsidiarity can 
only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. By consequence a thoughtful answer to the question 
whether to centralise or not, would demand case-specific careful empirical analysis.  
The decision to centralise policies in Europe or not is a complex one. Analysts have to 
weigh all the partly conflicting motives carefully. What the assessment of subsidiarity would 
entail is to express all arguments in an open debate. This paper has provided a possible 
framework to do exactly that.   37 
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